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Abstract This paper studies the impact of the possibility to enter a tour-
nament as a team on the gender gap in tournament entry. While a large and
significant gender gap in entry in the individual tournament is found in line
with the literature, no gender gap is found in entry in the team tournament.
While women do not choose to enter the tournament significantly more often
when it is team-based, men enter significantly less as part of a team than
alone. Changes in overconfidence as well as in risk, ambiguity and feedback
aversion, the difference in men and women’s taste for the uncertainty on
their teammate’s ability all account for a part of the disappearance of the
gender gap in tournament entry. A remaining explanation is that being part
of a team changes men and women’s taste for performing in a competitive
environment.
Résumé Ce papier étudie l’impact de la possibilité d’entrer en équipe
dans un tournoi sur la différence hommes-femmes dans la décision d’entrer.
Alors qu’en adéquation avec la littérature, une grande différence hommes-
femmes dans la décision d’entrer dans le tournoi individuel est trouvée, il
n’y a plus de différence dans la décision d’entrer dans le tournoi en équipe.
Ce changement n’est pas dû au fait que les femmes entrent plus en équipe
que seules mais au fait que les hommes entrent nettement moins dans le
tournoi en équipe que dans le tournoi individuel. L’impact différent pour
les hommes et les femmes du passage d’un tournoi individuel à un tournoi
en équipe sur leur surconfiance, leur aversion au risque, à l’ambiguité et au
feedback expliquent en partie pourquoi les hommes et les femmes choisissent
dans des proportions similaires le tournoi en équipe alors que ce n’était pas
le cas pour le tournoi individuel. Un autre facteur explicatif réside dans une
réaction différente des hommes et des femmes à l’incertitude sur le niveau de
leur coéquipier. L’explication résiduelle est que le fait de faire partie d’une
équipe augmente le goût des femmes pour la compétition et diminue celui
des hommes.
JEL Codes: D81, C91. Keywords: Gender Gap, Tournament,Teams
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1 Introduction
The existence of a gender gap in income and social positions in the american
and european labor markets is a well known and documented fact. De la
Rica et al. (2008) showed that for highly educated workers the wage gap
increases as one moves up the distribution. Using a sample composed of a
large group of US firms Bertrand and Hallock (2001) found that only 2.5%
of the executives in their sample were women. This under-representation of
women at high levels of the hierarchy may have several explanations among
which a lower ability or the fact that they could suffer from discrimination
(Goldin, 1990). The explanation explored in the present paper is a difference
between genders in the taste for evolving in competitive environments. Fox
and Lawless (2004) showed that women who share the same personal char-
acteristics and professional qualifications as men express significantly lower
levels of political ambition to hold elective office.
A recent research literature in experimental economics uses laboratory ex-
periments to study the gender gap in the propensity to enter competitive
environments (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007,
Niederle et al., 2007). The main idea is to compare subjects’ choices between
a remuneration which does not imply competition, i.e. a piece rate, and one
that does, i.e. a tournament. It is then found that women choose to enter
the tournament far less often than men resulting in a male-dominated pool
of entrants. More precisely, low-performing men enter the tournament too
much while high-performing women do not enter enough in comparison with
payoff-maximizing choices. Not only the gender gap in tournament entry pre-
vents from achieving diversity at the top of hierarchies, it also has a negative
impact on the average performance of candidates for these top-level positions
(i.e. entrants in the tournament in my experimental setting). This situation
detrimental to welfare calls for measures to urge highly able women to enter
competitions more often while discouraging men of low ability to do so.
Different explanations may account for this gender gap in tournament entry:
differences in performance, in overconfidence, in risk and ambiguity aversion.
The controlled experimental design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) allows
to disentangle the respective explanatory power of these different factors.
The results brings to light that, except for the difference in performance,
each of these factors helps explain part of the gender gap. However, after
adding all of these controls, a substantial gap remains which must be at-
tributed to a difference between genders in the taste for performing under
3
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the pressure of competition.
This paper explores the lead of teams as a way to reduce the gender gap
in tournament entry. It allows at the same time to further explain why
men enter tournaments more often than women. Numerous experimental
results sugggest that team decision-making may induce more rational behav-
iors (Cason and Mui, 1997, Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998, Cooper and Kagel,
2005, Kocher and Sutter, 2005). The notion of team used in the present pa-
per is a minimal one: a participant only knows that if he chooses to enter the
team tournament he will be randomly matched with someone who made the
same choice and that if their average performance beats the average perfor-
mance of their 2 opponents they will both receive 1 euro times their average
performance. However, he will not know who his teammate is or have any
information abour him or her. One can nevertheless expect an effect of the
tournament being team-based rather than individual on participants’ deci-
sion to enter and more precisely on the gender gap in tournament entry.
First of all, the tournament being team-based rather than individual changes
one’s expected payoff from entering the tournament for each level of per-
formance. Nevrtheless, as the probability changes in the exact same way
whether you are a man or a woman, one can rule out the possibility that this
change of probability might cause a reduction in the gender gap in tourna-
ment entry.
Second of all, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Niederle et al. (2007) found
a significant gender gap in overconfidence. It could be the case that over-
confidence about one’s team chances to win the tournament differs from
overconfidence about one’s chances to win the individual tournament. Tajfel
(1970) discovered that groups formed on the basis of almost any distinction
are prone to ingroup bias. Within minutes of being divided into groups,
people tend to see their own group as superior to other groups. It could be
the case that men and women differ in how they are affected by this ingroup
bias. Women could for example be more optimistic than men about their
teammate’s performance.
Third of all, being part of a team could have a different effect on men and
women’s ambiguity, risk or feedback aversion.
Team and individuals do not have the same risk preferences. Shupp and
Williams (2007) found that the variance of risk preferences is generally smaller
for groups than individuals and the average group is more risk averse than
the average individual in high-risk situations, but groups tend to be less risk
averse in low-risk situations. Rockenbach et al. (2007) showed that compared
4
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to individuals, teams accumulate significantly more expected value at a sig-
nificantly lower total risk. Being part of a team may have a different impact
on men and women’s risk preferences. Women could for example be less risk
averse as part of a team than alone.
Fourth of all, in a team competition one’s performance influences one’s team-
mate’s payoffs and one’s payoffs are influenced by one’s teammate’s perfor-
mance. For instance, if my teammate is worse than I am, it will lower both
my probability of winning the tournament and my payoff if we do win. Char-
ness and Jackson (2008) explore play between groups where one member of
each 2-person group dictates the play of that group and is therefore respon-
sible for the payoff of the other group member. They find that a substantial
part of the population plays a less risky strategy when choosing for a group
than when playing only for herself. Again, men and women may react dif-
ferently to this responsability issue.
Last of all, the taste for competing might change depending on whether one
is part of a team or alone. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) found that women
and men differ in their taste for performing in a competitive environment.
Namely, overconfidence, risk and feedback aversion put aside, men like per-
forming in a competitive environment more than women. The fact that the
tournament is no longer an individual one could have a different impact on
men and women’s thrill or fear of competition. Indeed, a literature interested
in gender differences in economic decisions (Eckel and Grossman, 1998, 2001,
2008, Ortmann and Tichy, 1999) finds that women tend to be more socially-
oriented and less individually-oriented than men as well as more cooperative
and less selfish.
For all these reasons, one may think that women may be more drawn to com-
petition when part of a team than alone. For instance, in research, women
may feel more comfortable entering the competition of publication with a
coauthor rather than by themselves. One can also think that a way to en-
courage more women to apply to high-profile jobs or top-positions universities
would be to advertise that it will imply a lot of teamwork in the future.
A controlled experimental design built on that of Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007) is used where participants have to solve a real-effort exercise under
various compensation schemes some involving competition (alone or as part
of a team) while others do not. The basic idea is to have participants make
a choice between a piece rate and a tournament either individual or team-
based before they have to perform.
I find that when the tournament is team-based no gender gap in entry is ob-
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served while in line with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Niederle et al.
(2007), henceforth NV and NSV, an important gender gap is found in the
individual tournament entry. While women enter as often alone as when part
of a team, men enter significantly less often when part of a team.
The design of the experiment allows to disentangle the role played by several
factors in explaining the disappearance of the gender gap in entry. The tour-
nament being team-based rather than individual may have a different impact
on men and women’s confidence on their chances to win, as well as on their
risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion. Men and women may also react in a
different way to the uncertainty surrounding their teammate’s ability. Each
of these factors account for a part of the disappearance of the gender gap in
tournament entry. Nevertheless, they do not explain all of it. The remaining
explanation must be that being part of a team changes how men and women
like to perform in a competitive environment.
From a welfare perspective it seems advisable to attempt to obtain a more
equal representation of men and women among participants who choose the
tournament and, as much as possible, to have the highly able participants en-
ter the competition. It is then important to prompt high-performing women
to enter while discouraging low-performing men to do so. Team tournament
helps getting a gender-balanced pool of entrants but it negatively affects its
quality as high-performing men are driven away from the Team Tournament
by the uncertainty on their teammate’s ability. My results seem to suggest
that high-performing men’s distate for the Team Tournament comes from
their not wanting to help a less deserving participant get a higher payoffs
and they seem ready to give up some of their payoffs to prevent that from
happening. As a result, a way of achieving both an equal representation of
genders among entrants and a good quality of the pool of competitors is to
provide information about one’s teammate’s level so that one knows that he
will be matched with a participant of about his level if he chooses to enter
the team tournament.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the ex-
perimental design. The results are given in section 3. Section 4 studies
the consequences on welfare of the type of tournament. Finally, section 5
provides some concluding remarks.
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2 Experimental Design
The experimental design builds on that of NV. The exercise subjects were
asked to perform is the same as in NV: additions of five 2-digit numbers.
Such an exercise can be considered as somehow male-oriented as some people
would expect men to outperform women on average. This is not a big concern
here as this paper belongs to a literature interested in the real-life issue of
the under-representation of women in highly-valued positions were there is
indeed a stereotype that men are better suited than women to succeed.
Participants were told that they had to complete 8 tasks of which two would
be randomly chosen for payment at the end of the experiment. At the end
of each task, participants were informed of their absolute performance (the
number of additions they correctly solved) but were not informed of their
relative performance until the end of the experiment. In a standard task,
participants had to choose between a piece rate and a remuneration scheme
involving competition (a tournament) before having 3 minutes to solve as
many additions as they could. The compensation schemes available changed
between tasks (see table 7 in appendix for a synthesis) and participants were
informed of their nature only immediately before performing the task.
2.1 The Tasks
Task 1. Piece Rate: Participants are given the 3 minutes addition exercise.
If task 1 is randomly chosen for payment, they receive 50 cents per correct
answer.
Task 2. Individual Tournament: Participants are given the 3 minutes
addition exercise. If task 2 is chosen for payment, the subject receives 1 euro
per correct answer if he solved more additions than his randomly chosen
opponent, otherwise he receives nothing.
Task 3. Choice between Piece Rate (PR henceforth) and Individ-
ual Tournament (IT henceforth): Before they perform their additions,
subjects have to choose whether they want to be paid according to the Piece
Rate (50 cents per correct answer) or the Individual Tournament compensa-
tion scheme. A participant who selects the tournament receives 1 euro per
correct answer if his task 3 performance exceeds the task 2 performance of
a randomly chosen opponent, otherwise he receives nothing. Subjects are
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competing against a competitive performance of their opponent but the de-
cision to enter the tournament is not affected by beliefs about whether the
opponent is going to enter. In addition, it allows to rule out that a partici-
pant may not enter because he or she may fear to inflict losses to his or her
opponent.
Task 3 bis. Choice between submitting task 1 performance to Piece
Rate or Individual Tournament: No additions to do here, the perfor-
mance which will determine the payoff is the task 1 performance. If a partic-
ipant chooses to submit his task 1 performance to the Piece Rate, he receives
0.5 euro times his task 1 performance. If he chooses to submit his task 1
performance to the individual tournament, he receives 1 euro per addition
correctly solved at task 1 if he solved more additions than his randomly cho-
sen opponent, otherwise he receives nothing. Task 3 bis is identical to task 3
(in both cases the tournament is a more risky choice implying more ambigu-
ity and subjecting the participant to a feedback at the end of the experiment
concerning whether he beated his opponent) except for the fact that it does
not involve a future performance. In particular, the participant who chooses
to submit his past performance to the tournament does not have to perform
under the pressure of competition. In consequence, any change in behavior
between tasks 3 and 3 bis will be attributed to the taste for performing in a
competitive environment.
Task 4. Choice between Piece Rate and Team Tournament: Subjects
have to choose whether they want to be paid according to the Piece Rate or
the Team Tournament. The Team Tournament is a 2 to 2 competition. If a
participant chooses the Team Tournament, 2 opponents are randomly drawn
among the other participants present in the room. 1 teammate is randomly
drawn among the participants who chose the team tournament. This implies
that a subject who chooses to enter the Team Tournament knows that his
or her teammate will have made the same choice so that both teammate
will be competing at the same time against their opponents, facilitating the
emergence of a team spirit. If the number of additions solved by one’s team
during task 4 exceeds the number of additions solved by the opposing team
during task 2, each teammate receives 1 euro times the average score of their
team. Otherwise, they receive nothing.
Task 4 bis. Choice between submitting task 1 performance to Piece
Rate or Team Tournament: No additions to do here, the performance
which will determine the payoff is the task 1 performance. If a participant
8
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chooses to submit his task 1 performance to the Piece Rate, he receives 0.5
euro times his task 1 performance. If he chooses to submit his task 1 per-
formance to the Team Tournament, 2 opponents are randomly drawn among
the other participants present in the room. 1 teammate is randomly drawn
among the participants who chose to submit to the Team Tournament. If
the number of additions solved by one’s team during task 1 exceeds the num-
ber of additions solved by the opposing team during task 1, each teammate
receives 1 euro times the average score of their team. Otherwise, they re-
ceive nothing. Task 4 bis is identical to task 4 (considering overconfidence,
risk aversion, uncertainty about teammate’s ability...) except for the fact
that it does not involve a future performance. In particular, the participant
who chooses to submit his past performance to the Team Tournament does
not have to perform under the pressure of competition. In consequence, any
change in behavior between tasks 4 and 4 bis will be attributed to the taste
for performing in a team competition.
Task 5. Choice between Piece Rate and Team Tournament with
a teammate of the same level (TTid henceforth): If a participant
chooses the Team Tournament with a teammate of the same level, 2 oppo-
nents are randomly drawn among the other participants present in the room.
1 teammate is attributed among the participants who chose the team tour-
nament: the participant whose task 2 performance was the closest to the
participant’s own task 2 performance. If the number of additions solved by
one’s team during task 4 exceeds the number of additions solved by the op-
posing team during task 2, each teammate receives 1 euro times the average
task 5 score of their team. Task 5 resembles task 4 in that the subjects have
to choose between a Piece Rate remuneration and a Team Tournament but
in task 5 the uncertainty about one’s teammate’s ability at solving additions
(or at least part of it) is taken away. Any difference in behavior between task
4 and task 5 will then be attributed to a reaction to this change.
Task 5 bis. Choice between submitting task 1 performance to Piece
Rate or Team Tournament with a teammate of the same level: No
additions to do here, the performance which will determine the payoff is the
task 1 performance. If a participant chooses to submit his task 1 perfor-
mance to the Piece Rate, he receives 0.5 euro times his task 1 performance.
If he chooses to submit his task 1 performance to the TTid, 2 opponents are
randomly drawn among the other participants present in the room. 1 team-
mate is attributed among the participants who chose the team tournament:
9
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the participant whose task 2 performance was the closest to the participant’s
own task 2 performance. If the number of additions solved by one’s team
during task 1 exceeds the number of additions solved by the opposing team
during task 1, each teammate receives 1 euro times the average score of their
team. Otherwise, they receive nothing.
2.2 Belief-assessment Questions
A difference in confidence between men and women may explain a signifi-
cant part of the gender gap in tournament entry. NV and NSV found that
both men and women are overconfident but men are more so. In order to
control for differences in confidence both in one’s chances to win the Indi-
vidual Tournament and in one’s team chances to win the Team Tournament,
participants had to answer belief-assessment questions at the end of the ex-
periment. Participants had to guess the mean task 1 and task 2 performances
of the participants in their session. The participants were reminded that dur-
ing task 4 they had to choose between a piece rate and a team-tournament,
for which 2 opponents were randomly drawn among the other participants
and a teammate was randomly drawn among the other participants who had
chosen the team tournament. They were also told that even if they had
chosen the Piece Rate at task 4, 2 opponents and 1 teammate had still been
randomly chosen in the exact same way. Their own task 2 performance was
reminded to them and participants had to guess the task 2 performances of
their teammate and opponents chosen during task 4. The participants were
reminded that during task 4 bis they had to choose between submitting their
task 1 performance to either a piece rate or a team-tournament, for which 2
opponents were randomly drawn among the other participants and a team-
mate was randomly drawn among the other participants who had chosen to
submit to the team tournament. They were also told that even if they had
chosen the piece rate at task 4 bis, 2 opponents and 1 teammate had still
been randomly chosen in the exact same way. Their own task 1 performance
was reminded to them and participants had to guess the task 1 performances
of their teammate and opponents of task 4 bis. A participant knew he would
earn 1 euro per correct guess.
10
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3 Results
The experiment was run at the Parisian Experimental Economics Labora-
tory (LEEP) of Paris 1 University. 39 men and 37 women took part in the
experiment. This section presents the results of this experiment. It starts by
studying the gender differences in performance and entry in the Individual
Tournament providing results in line with NV. Then, the gender differences in
entry in the team tournament are explored. Finally, the explanatory power
of the different potential explanations for the disappearance of the gender
gap in entry are investigated.
3.1 Gender Differences in Performance and in Entry in
the Individual Tournament
In this subsection, I check whether there are some gender differences in per-
formance which was the case in NSV but not in NV. I also look at the gender
gap in the individual tournament entry. In the present paper, a participant
to the individual tournament is the winner if he or she beats one opponent.
This one-to-one competition could have an effect on the participants’ decision
to enter. Men’s performances were slightly above women’s. In task 1 (piece
rate), men solved 5.9 additions on average while women solved 5.6 additions.
In task 2 (tournament), men solved 7.4 additions on average while women
solved 6.3 additions. These differences are not significant with a two-sided
Mann-Whitney test. While men perform significantly better under the tour-
nament than under the piece rate (a two-sided Mann-Whitney test yields
p=0.04), it is not the case for women (p=0.34). After having gone through
the piece rate and tournament remuneration schemes, participants have to
choose which one they want to perform under for task 3. If they choose
the tournament, they will be considered the winner if they beat the task
2 performance of their opponent. Considering the true distribution of task
2 performances, a payoff-maximizing participant should choose the tourna-
ment if his task 3 performance exceeds 7 (see Figure 14 in appendix: an
omniscient participant with a performance above or equal to 7 has higher ex-
pected payoffs from the individual tournament than from the piece rate). If
the participant’s task 3 performance is exactly the same as his task 2 perfor-
mance, 46% of women and 49% of men have higher expected earnings from
the tournament. This predicted gender gap is not significant (a two-sided
Mann-Whitney test yields p=0.81).
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Like in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), there is a gender gap in the Individ-
ual Tournament entry: 51.35% of women and 84.62% of men chose to enter
the individual tournament. This difference is significant with a two-sided
Mann-Whitney test (p=0.002). While men enter significantly more than ex-
pected (p=0.00), it is not the case for women (p=0.65). However the gender
gap in tournament entry is greater for participants with above median task
2 performances. 50% of low performing women and 62% of low performing
men chose to enter the individual tournament (a two-sided Mann Whitney
test yields p=0.57). Among high performing participants, 52% of women
and 96% of men entered the tournament (p<0.01). The first logit regression
of Table 1 shows tournament entry as a function of the participant’s gender
and task 2 performance. High performing participants tend to enter more
often but controlling for performance, women enter significantly less often
than men.
This gender-gap in tournament entry have several potential explanations:
differences in overconfidence between men and women, differences in risk,
ambiguity and feedback aversion, differences in the taste for performing in
a competitive environment. We start by examining whether men are more
overconfident than women as found in NV and NSV. At the end of the exper-
iment, participants’ task 2 performance was reminded to them and they had
to guess the task 2 performance of their teammate and opponents at task 4.
From their answer, their guessed rank was computed and the guessed ranks
conditionnal to the actual task 2 performance (4 goups of level were built
corresponding each to 25% of participants) were compared.
Figure 1. Mean Guessed Rank for each Performance Level
12
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Table 1: Logit of Tournament-Entry Decision (Task 3)
Regressors (1) (2) (3)
Female -0.29 -0.25 -0.16
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Perf2 0.05 0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.19) (0.49)
Guesswin 0.40 0.33
(0.01) (0.04)
Submit 0.15
(0.01)
The table presents marginal effects computed at a man with a task 2 performance of 6.86
which corresponds to the average task 2 performance. p-values are in brackets.
Looking at 1, it seems that both men and women are overconfident but
men to a greater extent. An ordered logit regression of the guessed rank
yields a negative and significant (p<0.01) coefficient of task 2 performance
and a positive and significant effect of Female (p=0.07). The higher the task
2 performance, the better the participant thinks he is while, for a given per-
formance, men are more overconfident than women.
The second regression of Table 1 shows that the more confident the partic-
ipant is about winning (guesswin=1 if the participant’s guess of the mean
task 2 performance is below his own task 2 performance, else guesswin=0),
the more prone he is to enter the tournament. Adding this control for this
measure of overconfidence, the gender gap in tournament entry diminishes
but remains significant. The difference in overconfidence between genders
accounts for a part of the gender gap in tournament entry: the fact that
women are less confident than men in their chances to win the tournament
helps explain why they enter the tournament less often. Nevertheless, when
controlling for Task 2 performance and beliefs about winning, women still
choose to enter less often than men meaning that the gender gap in entry is
not only due to women being less able or less confident than men.
In order to also control for the role of risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion
in the gender gap in tournament entry, the task 3 bis decision to submit the
task 1 performance to either a piece rate or an individual tournament is used.
Indeed, the tasks 3 and 3 bis decisions are the same except for the fact that
only in task 3 does the participant actually have to perform in a competitive
environment. In consequence, when adding the task 3 bis decision in the
13
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regressors, any remaining gender gap will be attributed to a difference in the
taste for performing under a competition. The third regression of Table 1
shows that a participant who chooses to submit his task 1 performance is
more likely to choose to enter the individual tournament but a great and
significant gender gap remains. The fact that women are more averse to risk,
ambiguity and feedback than men helps explain why they enter the tourna-
ment less often since the coefficient of Female diminishes when adding the
decision to submit to the regressors. Nevertheless, the residual significant
gender gap must be attributed to a difference in the taste for performing in
a competitive environment between genders. These results are in line with
NV and NSV.
3.2 Gender Differences in Entry in the Team Tourna-
ment
Like for the Individual Tournament, anyone with higher expected earnings
from the Team Tournament than the Piece Rate should enter the Team
Tournament. As can be seen in Figure 14 of Appendix B, this corresponds
to participants with a task 2 performance above or equal to 6. This is the
case of 62% of women and 67% of men. The predicted gender gap is not
significant (p=0.69).
Figure 2. Proportion of entrants men and women in the Individual Tournament (IT) and
Team Tournament (TT).
In line with the predictions, the data do not bring any gender gap to light:
62% of women and 59% of men chose to enter the team tournament (p=0.78).
14
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Men enter less than what is predicted by payoff maximizing choices but not
significantly less (p=0.49). As can be seen in figure 2, it appears that while
women do not choose to enter the tournament significantly more often when
it is team-based (p=0.35), men enter significantly less as part of a team than
alone (p=0.01).
Figure 3. Proportion of men enter-
ing the individual and team tour-
naments conditional on performance
level.
Figure 4. Proportion of women en-
tering the individual and team tour-
naments conditional on performance
level.
Figures 3 and 4 show the percentage of men and women who choose to
enter the individual and team tournament conditional on their task 2 perfor-
mance level. It can be seen that when the tournament is team based, men
tend to enter less often for a given probability of winning while women seem
to enter a little bit more. It is also noteworthy that the relation between
the performance level and the team tournament entry decision is decreasing
for men. The logit regression of men’s decision to enter the team tourna-
ment on the probability of winning (see the Appendix for an explanation
of how the probability of winning was computed) provides a negative but
only marginally significant coefficient (p=0.0984). The implications of the
tournament being team-based rather than individual on the pool of entrants
will be discussed in subsection 4.3.
A logit regression of the decision to enter a tournament (task 3 and task
4) on the probability of winning and a team dummy (team=1 for the task 4
decision to enter the Team Tournament and team=0 for the task 3 decision to
enter the Individual Tournament) is reported in Table 2. As two observations
were used for each participant (task 3 and task 4 decisions to enter each of
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Table 2: Logit of Tournament-Entry Decision (Tasks 3 and 4)
Regressors Men Women All
Female -0.21
(0.00)
Female*Team 0.15
(0.01)
Team -0.26 0.11 -0.15
(0.01) (0.32) (0.01)
Prob 0.16 0.12 0.14
(0.45) (0.67) (0.41)
The table presents marginal effects computed at a man in the individual tournament with
a 50% chance of winning the tournament. p-values are in brackets.
the tournaments), a cluster on the participant was used to take into account
the fact that the two decisions to enter the tournaments taken by a same
individual are not independent. Conditional on the probability of winning,
the fact that the tournament is team-based decreases men’s propension to
enter while it has no significant effect on women’s decision to enter. The
probability of winning has no significant effect on either men or women’s
propension to enter. Overall, participants tend to choose less often to enter
the tournament when it is team-based. The positive and strongly significant
marginal effect of Female*Team shows that when the tournament is team-
based the gender gap in tournament entry is significantly reduced.
3.3 Explanations of the Changes in Tournament Entry
between the Individual Tournament and the Team
Tournament
The change in the probability of winning does not provide an explanation for
the reduction of the gender gap in tournament entry which arises between
the individual and the team tournament as both men and women endure the
same distortion of the probability of winning. In this subsection, the roles of
the other potential explanations cited in section 2 are investigated.
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3.3.1 The role of Beliefs
Confidence in one’s chances to win the Individual Tournament helped ex-
plain one’s decision to enter the Individual Tournament. In the Individual
Tournament, men were found to be more overconfident in their chances of
winning than women. It would be interesting to see whether it is also the
case for the team tournament or if the gender difference in overconfidence is
reversed when participants are part of a team. For instance, women could
feel more confident about their chances of winning when they are paired with
a teammate because they could be more optimistic than men about the per-
formance of their teammate. In such a case, this change in beliefs would
help explain the reduction of the gender gap in tournament entry. To assess
for this potential explanatory power of beliefs on the disappearance of the
gender gap in entry in the Team Tournament, we use the dummy Guesswin
which equals 1 if the participant’s beliefs are consistent with winning the
tournament, and 0 otherwise. Remember that a participant knows his ab-
solute performance at each task. For the Individual Tournament, Guesswin
equals 1 if the participant thinks his task 2 performance is above average
and 0 otherwise. For the Team Tournament, Guesswin equals 1 if the par-
ticipant’s think the sum of his task 2 performance and his teammate’s task2
performance exceeds the sum of their opponents’task 2 performances.
Table 3: Logit of Tournament-Entry Decision (Tasks 3 and 4)
Regressors Men Women All
Female -0.17
(0.00)
Female*Team 0.13
(0.01)
Team -0.20 0.14 -0.11
(0.02) (0.29) (0.01)
Prob -0.17 0.03 -0.03
(0.45) (0.92) (0.86)
Guesswin 0.39 0.16 0.23
(0.01) (0.33) (0.03)
The table presents marginal effects computed at a man in the individual tournament with
a 50% chance of winning the tournament and with beliefs consistent with winning the
tournament. p-values are in brackets.
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The first regression reported in table 3 shows that beliefs help explain
men’s decision to enter the tournaments. Controlling for beliefs, the coef-
ficient of Team in men’s regression is reduced showing that part of the ex-
planation why men enter less often in the tournament when it is team-based
comes from men being less confident in their chances of winning the tourna-
ment as part of a team than alone. However, since Team remains negative
and significant, it must be that other factors account for men’s disaffection
for the tournament when it is team-based. On the other hand, beliefs are
not helpful in explaining women’s decision to enter. Overall, a participant
whose beliefs are consistent with winning the tournament is 23% more likely
to enter than a similar participant whose beliefs are consistent with losing the
tournament. Controlling for beliefs, the effect of Female*Team decreases but
remains positive and significant. The reduction of the gender gap in overcon-
fidence which occurs when the tournament becomes team-based helps explain
the disappearance of the gender gap in tournament entry but other factors
must play a role as this change in beliefs do not explain all of it.
3.3.2 The role of general factors: risk, ambiguity and feedback
aversion.
A second set of factors mentioned in section 2 which are likely to explain
part of the disappearance of the gender gap when the tournament is team-
based are general factors such as risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion. To
control for these, the decisions to submit the task 1 performance to the
individual and team tournaments are used. Indeed, the decisions to enter a
given tournament and to submit a past performance to the same tournament
are very similar in every aspects except for the fact that only when deciding
to enter a tournament does the participant actually have to perform in a
competitive environment. Consequently, by adding the decision to submit
one can see whether the disappearance of the gender gap occuring when the
tournament is team-based is fully accounted for by changes in general factors
or if part of it is due to remaining factors ie, changes in how men and women
like to perform in a competitive environment and differences in how they like
the uncertainty on their teammate’s ability.
Table 4 presents the logit regression of the decision to submit task 1 per-
formance to the tournament. Both decisions to submit to the individual and
to the team tournaments are used. It can be seen that neither for men nor
for women is team significant showing that the fact that the tournament is
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Table 4: Logit of submitting a past performance to a tournament (Tasks 3
bis and 4 bis)
Regressors Men Women All
Female 0.00
(0.48)
Female*Team 0.09
(0.19)
Team 0.00 0.20 0.07
(0.84) (0.16) (0.87)
Prob -0.09 0.57 0.24
(0.76) (0.12) (0.25)
Guesswin 0.27 -0.05 0.06
(0.07) (0.75) (0.47)
The table presents marginal effects computed at a man in the individual tournament with
a 50% chance of winning the tournament and with beliefs consistent with winning the
tournament. p-values are in brackets.
team-based rather than individual does not influence the decision to submit
to a tournament. In particular, men are not less likely to submit a past per-
formance to a tournament when it is team-based while they choose to enter
a tournament significantly less as part of a team than alone. In the pooled
regression, Female*Team is not significant showing that the fact that the
tournament is team-based does not help reduce the gender-gap in submis-
sion to the tournament. It must be that factors other than risk, ambiguity
and feedback aversion play a role in explaining the disppearance of the gender
gap when the tournament is team-based. In the logit regressions presented
in Table 5 the decision to submit task 1 performance was added to the re-
gressors to explain the decision to enter the tournament. For both men and
women, the decision to submit to the tournament helps explain the decision
to enter the tournament. Such is also the case in the pooled regression where
it can be seen that compared with someone who decided not to submit, an
otherwise similar participant who did submit has a 27% higher chance of
entering the tournament.
When adding this new control, men still react negatively to the fact that
the tournament is team-based but less so. This suggests that men are more
risk, ambiguity and feedback averse as part of a team than alone and it helps
explain why they do not enter as often the Team Tournament than they did
19
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Table 5: Logit of Tournament-Entry Decision (Tasks 3 and 4)
Regressors Men Women All
Female -0.09
(0.00)
Female*Team 0.06
(0.02)
Team -0.11 0.12 -0.05
(0.00) (0.60) (0.00)
Prob -0.06 -0.17 -0.12
(0.77) (0.48) (0.40)
Guesswin 0.21 0.17 0.17
(0.02) (0.22) (0.01)
Submit 0.25 0.27 0.27
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
The table presents marginal effects computed at a man in the individual tournament
with a 50% chance of winning the tournament, with beliefs consistent with winning the
tournament and who submitted his task 1 performance to the tournament. p-values are
in brackets.
the Individual Tournament. Nevertheless, as the coefficient of Team remains
negative and significant, other factors must play a role in men’s disaffection
for the Team Tournament: men do not enjoy performing in a competitive
environment as much when it is a team competition or they dislike the uncer-
tainty on their teammate’s ability. As for women, the coefficient of Team as
decreased but remains positive and significant showing that women must ex-
perience less risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion in the Team Tournament
than in the Individual Tournament but it is not enough to explain all of their
extra pull for competition when it is team-based. In the pooled regression
Female*Team decreased when the decision to submit is added to the regres-
sors but it remains positive and significant. The tournament specific factors
explain a significant part of the disappearance of the gender gap in tourna-
ment entry: the reduction of the gender gap in risk and ambiguity aversion
happening when the tournament becomes team-based is responsible for part
of the disappearance of the gender gap in tournament entry. Nevertheless,
a part of this disappearance remains unexplained. It could be accounted for
by a difference in how men and women like (or, most probably, dislike) the
uncertainty about their teammate’s ability.
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3.3.3 The role of uncertainty about one’s teammate’s ability.
The effect of one last factor cited has to be controlled for: the taste for in-
fluencing one’s teammate’s payoffs and for having one’s teammate influence
one’s payoffs. In order to do so the task 5 decision to enter the Team Tour-
nament with a teammate of the same level (TTid) is used in addition to the
tasks 3 and 4 decisions. The task 5 decision resembles the task 4 decision
(team tournament) except for the fact that the uncertainty about the level of
one’s teammate in the addition task (or at least part of it) is removed since
the participant knows that if he enters the tournament he will be matched
with a teammate whose task 2 performance is close to his own.
Table 6: Logit of Tournament-Entry Decision (Tasks 3, 4 and 5)
Regressors Men Women All
Female -0.05
(0.00)
Female*Team 0.04
(0.01)
Team -0.07 0.15 -0.01
(0.00) (0.68) (0.00)
Prob 0.07 -0.22 -0.04
(0.60) (0.24) (0.71)
Guesswin 0.24 0.22 0.21
(0.01) (0.06) (0.00)
Submit 0.29 0.36 0.35
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IdPartn 0.06 0.08 0.17
(0.15) (0.35) (0.07)
The table presents marginal effects computed at a man in the Individual Tournament
with a 50% chance of winning the tournament, with beliefs consistent with winning the
tournament and who submitted his task 1 performance to the tournament. p-values are
in brackets.
In the regressions reported in Table 6 the dummy IdPartn equals 1 for
the task 5 decision and 0 otherwise. The fact that a participant knows that
his teammate will be of a similar level to his own if he chooses to enter the
tournament makes it more likely for him to choose to enter. IdPartn helps
explain why men do not like team competition suggesting that men’s taste
for competition decreases when it is team-based. However as Team is still
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negative and significant, it must be that the uncertainty on their teammate’s
ability also explains why men are less drawn to the Team Tournament than
they are to the Individual Tournament. As for women, as the coeefficient
of Team increases when IdPartn is added to the regressors, it seems that
the tournament being team-based makes them like competition more. In
the pooled regression, the introduction of IdPartn reduces the coefficient on
Female*Team to 4%. Part of the disappearance of the gender gap which
occurs when the tournament becomes team-based is due to the fact that
when the tournament is team-based a change occurs in how men and women
like to perform in a competitive environment probably in the sense of men
not liking to perform in a competitive environment as much when part of a
team. Nevertheless, as the coefficient on Female*Team remains significant,
part of the disappearance of the gender gap is not accounted for by a different
impact of the tournament being team-based on men and women’s taste for
evolving in a competitive environment but must be attributed to the fact
that men do not like the uncertainty on their teammate’s level when having
to perform in a team competition.
4 Consequences on welfare of the tournament
being team-based rather than individual.
The introduction of the team tournament was successful in wiping out the
gender gap in tournament entry. It is obviously essential to closely study
the consequences of the team tournament on other aspects in order to weigh
up the pros and cons. This section studies the consequences of the type of
tournament on participants’ payoffs as well as on the pool of entrants and its
quality, ie, the performance of those who choose to enter. It allows to draw
some conclusions on the implications of the choice of a type of competition
on both contestants and head-hunters.
4.1 Consequences of the type of tournament on the prob-
ability of winning and expected payoffs
The consequences of the tournament being team-based on the quality of the
pool of entrants and their payoffs will depend on the change in the probability
of winning and expected payoffs all other things being equal but also on the
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change in behavior which in turn has an impact on the probability of winning
and expected payoffs. Remember that when entering the Team Tournament a
participant knows that he will be matched with a teammate who also chose to
enter the team tournament. Hence, the level of other participants who chose
to enter has an impact on a participant’s probability to win if he enters as
well as on his payoffs if he enters and wins (as each teammate of the winning
team earns 1 euro times the average performance of the team). First of all,
let us look at figures 5 and 6 which represent respectively the probability of
winning and the expected payoffs for each of the 3 tournaments conditional
on performance (the details of the computations are provided in Appendix
A.
Figure 5. Probability of winning the
tournaments conditional on perfor-
mance.
Figure 6. Expected payoffs of the
tournaments conditional on perfor-
mance.
It can be seen that while for the individual and the team tournament
with a teammate of the same level both the probabilities of winning and
the expected payoffs are close such is not the case for the Team Tourna-
ment. Indeed, the Team Tournament provides higher expected payoffs than
the 2 other tournaments for low-performing participants and lower expected
payoffs for high-performing participants. When taking the actual pool of en-
trants of the Team Tournament to calculate the probabilities and expected
payoffs of an entrant conditional on his performance the results are really
similar.
The average task 2 performance of the team Tournament entrants (6.52) is
lower than the average task 2 performance of the whole group (6.86) but it
is far from being significant. Nevertheless this is not unexpected as the dif-
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ference of performance between those who did choose to enter and those who
did not is not significant (a two-sided Mann Whitney test yields p=0.30) im-
plying all the more that the difference of performance between the entrants
and the whole group is not significant either. The fact that the Team Tour-
nament implies a transfer of payoffs from high-performing to low-performing
participants casts some doubt on whether it is appropriate from an ethical
point of view. Notice that the Team Tournament with a teammate of the
same level has the huge advantage of almost not distorting the probabilities
of winning and expected payoffs of the individual tournament.
4.2 Consequences on participants’ payoffs
Figure 7 shows the payoffs of men and women corresponding to the 3 kinds
of tournaments 1.
Figure 7. Payoffs of men and women for the 3 tournaments.
The gender payoff gap is marginally significant for the individual tourna-
ment and the team tournament with a teammate of the same level (p=0.11
each time with a two-sided Mann-Whitney test) but it is far from being sig-
nificant (p=0.33) for the team tournament. The disappearance of the gender
gap in payoffs occuring in the Team Tournament comes nevertheless with a
cost as men undergo a decrease in their payoffs why women’s payoffs remain
1For a participant who chose the piece rate it equals 0.5 times his or her performance
while for a participant who chose the tournament it equals his expected payoff given his
performance.
24
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.06
stable (due to high-performing men not entering the tournament when it
is team-based). It is then worth wondering whether this dumbing down of
payoffs is too high a price for gender equality. Notice that providing informa-
tion on one’s teammate’s ability is enough to see men’s payoffs go up again
increasing in turn the gender payoff gap.
4.3 Consequences of the type of tournament on the qual-
ity of the pool of entrants
A question crucial to our interest is how the type of tournament influences
the quality of the pool of entrants. Figure 8 represents the percentage of
participants who chose to enter each of the 3 tournaments conditional on
task 2 performance level. Compared with the Individual Tournament, more
low-performing and fewer high-performing participants choose to enter the
Team Tournament. This obviously affects the average performance of the
entrants even though the difference in performance between the entrants of
the individual and team tournament is not significant (p=0.18 for the two-
sided Mann Whitney test and p=0.09 for the one-sided test). On the other
hand, the proportion of entrants of each performance level in the TTid is
similar to the proportion of entrants in the Individual Tournament.
Figure 8. Proportion of entrants in the tournaments conditional on performance level.
Looking at figures 9 and 10, it can be observed that the quality of the
pool of men entrants is deteriorated when the tournament becomes team-
based. However, this shortcoming is overcome when one entrant knows that
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his teammate will be of ability close to his own as it is the case in the TTid.
As for women, they seem to enter a little bit more whatever their performance
level when the tournament is team-based. Furthermore, whether they know
something about the ability of their teammate does not change much their
propensity to enter.
Figure 9. Proportion of men enter-
ing the tournaments conditional on
performance level.
Figure 10. Proportion of women en-
tering the tournaments conditional
on performance level.
Figure 11 shows the average performances of men and women entrants in
the 3 kinds of tournaments. Each time, men are slightly better than women
but not significantly so. We can observe a decrease of men’s performance
when the tournament becomes team-based which is however not significant.
It may be due to men shirking when part of a team but it may also be caused
by the crowding out effect of the team tournament on high-performing men.
Women entrants’ performance on the other hand is very stable across tourna-
ments. In consequence, the fact that the tournament is team-based does not
negatively affect women’s performances. Still, the average performance of
entrants is lower under the Team Tournament (6.48) than under the Individ-
ual Tournament (7.48). Men’s performance goes up again when participants
know that they will be matched with a teammate of the same level.
In order to check whether male entrants’ average performance is lower
under the team tournament than under the individual tournament because
of shirking behaviors, I look at differences in performance of men who chose
to enter the Team Tournament between the 3 kinds of tournaments. In fig-
ure 12 it appears that there is almost no difference in the performance of
men who chose to enter the team tournament between the individual and
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Figure 11. Performances of men
and women entrants in the 3 tour-
naments.
Figure 12. Performances of men and
women who chose to enter the TT in
the 3 tournaments.
the team tournament. I can therefore rule out shirking as an explanation for
the decrease in performance of men entrants between the individual and the
team tournament. The remaining explanation is the crowding out effect of
high-performing men when the tournament is team-based and participants
do not know anything about their teammate’s ability. It seems to suggest
that high-performing men’s distate for the Team Tournament comes from
their not wanting to help a less deserving participant get a higher payoffs
and they seem ready to give up some of their payoffs to prevent that from
happening.
Team competition seems to be the solution to get a gender-balanced pool
of tournament entrants. Nevertheless, the uncertainty about their teammate
has a crowding out effect on high-performing men, while low-performing men
are prompted to enter. Providing information about one’s teammate’s abil-
ity seems to be the condition to make the gender gap in tournament entry
disappear without deteriorating the average ability of entrants. However it
has the downside of keeping the gender payoff gap as it is in the Individual
Tournament.
5 Conclusion
This paper aims at studying the effect of a tournament being team-based
rather than individual on the gender gap in tournament entry. While a large
and significant gender gap in entry in the Individual Tournament is found in
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line with NV and NSV, no gender gap is found in entry in the Team Tourna-
ment. While women do not choose to enter the tournament significantly more
often when it is team-based, men enter significantly less as part of a team
than alone. A first explanation is a reduction of the gender gap in overconfi-
dence occuring when subjects are part of a team (men are less overconfident
when part of a team than alone). Another explanation lies in a change in
risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion: women become less risk, ambiguity
and feedback averse when part of a team than alone and men become more
risk, ambiguity and feedback averse. Another part of the disappearance of
the gender gap is due to men not liking the uncertainty on their teammate’s
ability. The remaining explanation is that being part of a team changes how
men and women like to perform in a competitive environment. While men
like evolving in a competitive environment more than women in an individ-
ual competition, this is less the case in a team competition, women enjoying
competition more when they have a teammate and men losing part of their
interest in competition when part of a team.
This paper therefore helps get a better understanding of why men tend to
like competition more than women. It seems that part of the gender gap in
the taste for evolving in a competitive environment comes from a difference
in how men and women like to be alone at the top. When men know that
they will have to share the glory of their victory with a teammate if they win
the competition, they are perceptibly less likely to engage in it. This could
help find a solution to the harmful consequences of men’s overconfidence in
certain fields such as finance where being blinded by the perspective of earn-
ing millions can lead to take too much risk and lose everything.
This experiment also provides a way of wiping out the gender gap in tourna-
ment entry. However, when looking closer at the consequences of the tour-
nament being team-based on welfare aspects, it appears that it negatively
affects the quality of the pool of entrants by crowding out the high-performing
men from tournament entry. High-performing men seem to be repeled by the
uncertainty on their teammate’s ability or by the idea that they might help
a less deserving participant get higher payoffs by entering the Team Tourna-
ment and as a result they choose not to enter the Team Tournament even
if it means getting lower payoffs. In turn, the average payoff of entrants
decreases when the tournament is team-based. There is nevertheless a way
of getting a gender-balanced pool of entrants without driving away high-
performing men from competition by providing contestants with information
about their teammate’s ability namely, telling them they will be matched
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with a teammate of level close to their own.
Obviously, teams cannot be implemented in every real-life situations where
competition is present: when a firm is willing to hire, the screening pro-
cess needs to be an individual one in order to make sure the most deserving
applicants are chosen. Nevertheless, enabling students to work in teams or
advertising for the fact that a large part of a job will induce team-working
may help get a more gender-balanced pool of applicants to top-level univer-
sities or high-profile jobs. If such is the case, allowing applicants to choose
their teammate may avoid scaring off high-performing men from applying.
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Appendices
A Differences between individual and team tour-
naments
For a given performance, the probability of winning the individual and team
tournament are not the same. Figure 1 2 shows for both types of tournament
the probability of winning conditional on performance. It can be seen that
low-performing participants have a higher probability of winning the team
tournament than the individual tournament while the opposite is true for
high-performing participants.
Figure 13. Probability of winning the individual and team tournaments conditional on
performance.
In addition to the probability of winning, what also changes between the
individual and team tournament is the expected payoff for a given perfor-
mance as shown in Figure 14 3. It can be seen that low-performing partici-
21.000.000 pairs of opponents’performances and 1.000.000 teammate’s performances
were drawn by sampling with replacement from the task 2 performances of the 76 partici-
pants. For each level of performance, the probability of winning the individual tournament
was computed by calculating the number of times out of 1.000.000 this given performance
exceeded the first opponent’s performance. Similarly, for each level of performance, the
probability of winning the team tournament was computed by calculating the number of
times out of 1.000.000 this given performance plus the partner’s performance exceeded the
sum of both opponent’s performances.
31.000.000 pairs of opponents’performances and 1.000.000 teammate’s performances
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pants have higher expected payoffs from entering the team tournament than
the individual tournament while the opposite is true for high performing par-
ticipants. This makes sense as if a low-performing participant wins the team
tournament, his payment depends on the average performance of his team
which is likely to exceed his own performance. On the contrary, if a high-
performing participant wins the team tournament, his payment depends on
the average performance of his team which is likely to be lower than his own
performance.
Figure 14. Expected payoffs of the piece rate and individual and team tournaments con-
ditional on performance.
Notice that in the present experiment participants do not face at any point
a choice between the individual and team tournaments but only between each
of these and the piece rate remuneration scheme (0.5 euro per correct addi-
tion). In consequence, if he expects his tasks 3 and 4 performances to be
the same as his task 2 performance, a payoff-maximizing participant should
choose the individual tournament if his task 2 performance is at least 7. Sim-
ilarly, a payoff-maximizing participant should choose the team trournament
if his task 2 performance is above or equal to 6.
were drawn by sampling with replacement from the task 2 performances of the 76 partic-
ipants. For each level of performance, the expected payoff from entering the individual
tournament was computed in the following way. For each given performance, the payoff
corresponding to each of the 1.000.000 first opponent’s performances was computed and
averaged. Similarly, for each level of performance, the expected payoff from entering the
team tournament was computed by calculating the payoff corresponding to each of the
1.000.000 different sets of 1 teammate’s and 2 opponents’s performances and averaging it.
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